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CURRENT LEGISLATION
N. Y. GENERAL CORPORATION LAW-REVIVAL OF CORPORATE
EXISTENCE AFTER EXPIRATION OF CHARTER.-On April 6, 1944 the
New York Legislature, on the recommendation of the Law Revision
Commission,' added Section 49 2 to New York General Corporation
Law. This new section provides for the revival of corporate exis-
tence at any time after the term of duration, as provided in the char-
ter of a corporation, has expired.
Under the prior enacted law, provision had been made, by Sec-
tion 45 3 of the New York General Corporation Law, for extending
the term of corporate existence by corporate action at any time before
the expiration of the charter. However, under this prior statute a
failure to act before the expiration date would have been fatal, and
the defunct corporation could have regained its original legal exis-
tence only by the application of one of two alternate remedies. Either
it would have had to go through the process of liquidation and start
de novo with reincorporation, or else it would have been forced to
seek a special act of legislature authorizing its revival. 4 Section 46 5
of the New York General Corporation Law, provided that a limited
corporate revival might be obtained at the request of any interested
party,- as for example a creditor, through a judicial authorization
which would permit the stockholders to vote on the question of such
revival.
The method of revival under the new law is substantially the
same procedure as prescribed for the extension of the corporate ex-
istence under Section 45. There is, however, an important excep-
tion. In order to execute and file the certificate of revival, in the
case of a stock corporation, authorization must be given by the vote
or written consent of holders of record of at least a majority of the
shares of each class of stock, whether such classes are by the corpo-
rate charter entitled to vote, or not.0 Former New York law dealing
'See Report of the Law Revision Commission, LEGIs. Doc. No. 65(A)(1944).
2 N. Y. GEN. COR". LAW § 49, added L. 1944, c. 591, § 1 (April 6, 1944).
3N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 45, L. 1929, c. 650, § 1 (Oct. 1, 1929).
4 Twenty-three corporations were revived by special act of legislature in
New York in 1941 and 1942. See Report of the Law Revision Commission,
LEGIS. Doc. No. 65(I) (1943).
5 N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 45, enacted 1929, providing for limited revival
where any domestic corporation has bonds outstanding, which are payable sub-
sequent to the expiration of its term of corporate duration, and such bonds are
unmatured and unpaid at such subsequent period, or where the corporation is a
bapk which has issued any obligation or incurred any indebtedness unpaid at
the time application for revival is made.8 N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 49, subd. 3, requiring that a meeting be called
for the purpose of obtaining the stockholders' consent in writing or by vote.
Notice of such meeting must be given to all holders of record of shares of the
corporation.
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with extension or limited revival of corporate existence secured only
to holders of certain voting classes of stock the privilege of voting for
such extension or revival. In order to safeguard the stockholders'
rights the new law allows holders of those classes of stock which are
by the corporate charter not normally entitled to vote, the right of
participating in the important question of corporate revival. This
safeguard is reflected in the amendment to Section 51 7 of the New
York Stock Corporation Law passed to prevent a conflict with this
new law. The intended result of such legislation is to invalidate any
provision in a corporate charter which authorizes revival by less than
the majority vote, or which excludes any class of stockholders from
voting on such a question.
The new Section 49 applies to domestic corporations, but does
not include those corporations where the intent of either the legisla-
ture 8 or of the corporation itself 9 is such that those who control the
corporate existence have effectively prevented revival. A corpora-
tion which has been dissolved by the order, judgment or decree of
any court, may, naturally, have no recourse to any revival statute.
The constitutionality of legislation involving corporate existence
is based on a "contract theory" as first introduced into the field of
corporation law by the decision in Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward,10 whereby any material change in the charter made with-
out the consent of the parties constituted an impairment of the con-
tract, and was, on that ground, held to be unconstitutional." This
led to a reservation by the states 12 of a sovereign power to amend and
repeal corporate laws, and it is subject to this reservation that char-
ters 13 are obtained. Therefore it may be assumed that a statutory
revival provision will be held constitutional on the ground that it
leaves intact the end and purposes of the corporation as declared in
its original charter, with the sole effect of enlarging the time for its
corporate existence.14
7 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 51, L. 1944, c. 591, § 2 (April 6, 1944). The
new amendment reads: "Notwithstanding any of the provisions of this section,
the consent or vote required for revival of corporate existence under section
forty-nine of the general corporation law shall be governed solely by the pro-
visions thereof."
8 N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 49, subd. 11. The provisions of this section
shall not apply to corporations created by special law; nor to corporations
incorporated under section fifty-nine of the education law...
9 Id. subd. 11. . . . nor to any corporation whose stockholders have passed
a resolution for dissolution or liquidation; ...
10 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. Ed.
629 (U. S. 1819).
"I U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 10.
12 Cf. 8 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
(Perm. ed. 1932) § 3658; N. Y. CoNsT. Art. X, § 1; N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 5
(L. 1895, c. 672, § 2).
13 Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 194 N. Y. 212, 87 N. E. 443
(1909).
14 Union Hotel Co. v. Hersee, 79 N. Y. 454, 35 Am. Rep. 536 (1880),
where an extension of a corporation, incorporated by special act of the State
1944 ]
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With regard to dissenting stockholders' rights, although no pro-
vision 15 has been made in Section 49 for an appraisal of their stock,
the legislature should consider their statutory protection in this regard
rather than leave them mere equitable relief.16 The present New
York appraisal statutes 17 are not applicable to the new revival statute
since they are enforceable only in specified types of corporate re-
adjustment.
The present statute 18 provides that a corporation revived under
it is "deemed to have had a continuous legal existence as a corpora-
tion, and all its acts are as valid as if the corporation never expired."
This retroactive provision presents the question of the legal status of
a corporation in the interim between the expiration of its charter and
its revival. A corporation is, per se, capable of perpetual succession 19
until legally dissolved. However, the life of the corporation may be
fixed and limited to a definite term by constitutional, statutory or
charter provisions, and where it is so limited the corporation ceases
to exist and is dissolved, ipso facto, at the expiration of the fixed term
of its duration,20 unless by statute such term is prolonged for the
adjustment or closing of its business.21 If the corporate charter is
not so extended the corporation has no legal status either de jure or
de facto.22
It seems clear that the legislative intent in the present revival
statute is its application principally to those corporations which have
of New York, was held valid and within the "reserved power" as against a
corporate subscriber claiming that such extension was a violation of his con-
tract. The court held that such a change was not organic. Hinkley v.
Schwarzchild and Sultzberger Co., 107 App. Div. 470, 95 N. Y. Supp. 357(1905).
15 In approving the new section (L. 1944, c. 591, § 1) the Governor stated,
in part: "There is still one safeguard which is lacking. Under the present bill
a dissenting stockholder has no remedy in the event of a revival. He should
be permitted to have an appraisal of his stock, and obtain the value thereof in
a manner similar to the situation in wlhich other dissenting stockholders find
themselves in accordance with the provisions of section 21 of the N. Y. Stock
Corporation Law . . . I do urge, . . . that at the next session of the Legis-
lature, this additional remedy and safeguard be carefully considered, and the
law amended appropriately."
16See Dodd, Amendments to Corporate Charters (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 585, at 735.
17 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §§ 14, 20, 36, 38, 85, 86, 87 and 91.is N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 49, subd. 8.
19 Snell v. Chicago, 133 Ill. 413, 428, 24 N. E. 532 (1890).20 In re Friedman, 177 App. Div. 755. 164 N. Y. Supp. 892 (1917).
21 N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 29; N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 105, subd. 8.
22 In Meramec Spring Park Co. v. Gibson. 268 Mo. 394, 188 S. W. 179
(1916), the court held that the view that a de facto corporation could be kept
alive indefinitely by user and usurpation, apart from statutes, would render
nugatory all organizational corporate law and would be tantamount to saying
to the corporation, "Observe the law, become a de fire corporation, and die of
old age in twenty years; refuse to follow the law, become a de facto corpora-
tion, and live forever." See annotation: POWER OF CORPORATION AFTER EX-
PIRATION oR FORFEITURE OF ITS CHARTER, 47 A. L. R. 1288, 1298.
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continued to exercise corporate powers after their term of duration
has expired. Under this statute a corporation which has so contin-
ued in business is deemed to have had a continuous legal existence as
a corporation and all its acts are thereby validated. It would there-
fore seem that the so called revival provision is little more than an
extension. There are authorities 23 which recognize a corporation as
de facto if it continues in business after the expiration of its charter.
There is no other legal basis on which to place the retroactive effect
of Section 49 than on the theory of de facto existence after the ex-
piration of the charter. In a New York case 24 where a corporation
continued in business for three years after its alleged dissolution, it
was estopped to set up its dissolution as a ground for dismissing an
action against it for the performance of an executory contract to which
it had become a party after its dissolution. The reason for the estop-
pel was based upon the ground that the other party, a private indi-
vidual, was not chargeable with constructive notice of the expiration
date of the corporate charter, and so was not in pari delictu with the
corporation. It may be said that the better legal basis for the nunc
pro tunic provision of the present revival statute seems to be the de
facto doctrine. This doctrine should be employed as to permit flexi-
bility in working out the real equities of contending parties, and, if
possible, the rights of stockholders should be further protected by
legislation.
There are already some sixteen other states 25 in which corporate
revival statutes have proven successful without much litigation. This
may be ascertained from the lack of reported decisions in this field.
JOHN E. PERRY.
AN ACTION FOR THE REMOVAL OF ENCROACHING STRUCTURES.-
An action may be maintained by the owner of any legal estate in land
for an injunction directing the removal of a structure encroaching on
such land. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as limiting
the power of the court in such action to award damages in an appro-
priate case in lieu of an injunction or to render such other judgment
as the facts may justify.
23 Brady v. Delaware Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2 Penne. 415, 45 Ad. 345
(Del. 1899) ; Bushnell v. Consolidated Ice Machine Co., 138 Ill. 67, 27 N. E. 596
(1891) ; Campbell v. Perth Amboy Mut. Loan, Homestead & Bldg. Ass'n, 76 N. J.
Eq. 347, 74 At. 144 (1909). However, there is contrary authority which holds
that after a corporation is dissolved by judicial decree, or by the expiration of
the period fixed for its existence in the law under which it was organized, it is
not even a de facto corporation. Clark v. American Coal Co., 165 Ind. 213,
73 N. E. 1083 (1905) ; Knights of Pythias v. Weller, 93 Va. 605, 25 S. E. 891
(1896) ; Arlington Hotel Co. v. Rector, 124 Ark. 90, 186 S. W. 622 (1916);
Venable Bros. v. Southern Granite Co., 135 Ga. 508, 69 S. E. 822 (1910).
24 Wilkins v. Sirael Realty Corp., 174 Misc. 1002, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 1017
(1940).
25 Report of the Law Revision Commission, LEGIs. Doc. No. 65(1) (1943).
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